Judicial Independence in Pakistan Executive Interference, Reforms and Rule of Law
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https://doi.org/10.59022/ijlp.504Keywords:
Judicial Independence, Executive Interference, Constitutional Amendments, Doctrine of Necessity, Judicial Appointments, Rule of Law, Separation of PowersAbstract
Pakistan's judiciary has operated under persistent executive dominance since independence in 1947, undermining the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers under Article 175 of the 1973 Constitution. This study examines how executive interference has shaped the failure of judicial reform efforts and contributed to rule of law deterioration. Employing qualitative doctrinal and document analysis, the research traces historical patterns from the doctrine of necessity through the 18th and 19th Constitutional Amendments to the transformative 26th and 27th Amendments of 2024 and 2025. Findings reveal that appointment manipulation, constitutional reversals, and formal institutionalization of political control have systematically weakened judicial autonomy. The 26th Amendment reduced judges to a minority within their own appointment body, while the 27th Amendment created an executive-controlled Federal Constitutional Court and granted lifetime military immunity. Pakistan urgently requires a transparent, merit-based appointment system aligned with international standards under the ICCPR and UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
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